Abstract. The concept of threshold ring signature in code-based cryptography was introduced by Aguilar et al. in [1]. Their proposal uses Stern's identification scheme as basis. In this paper we construct a novel threshold ring signature scheme built on the q-SD identification scheme recently proposed by Cayrel et al. in [14]. Our proposed scheme benefits of a performance gain as a result of the reduction in the soundness error from 2/3 for Stern's scheme to 1/2 per round for the q-SD scheme. Our threshold ring signature scheme uses random linear codes over the field Fq, secure in the random oracle model and its security relies on the hardness of an error-correcting codes problem (namely the q-ary syndrome decoding problem). In this paper we also provide implementation results of the Aguilar et al. scheme and our proposal, this is the first efficient implementation of this type of code-based schemes.
Introduction
The development in the field of quantum computing is a real threat to the security of many used public key cryptographic algorithms. Shor has demonstrated in 1994 that cryptographic schemes whose security relies on the difficulty of the factorization problem (e.g., RSA) and the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem (e.g., DSA), could be broken using quantum computers. Consequently, it is necessary to have available alternative signature and identification schemes.
Coding based cryptography is one of the few alternatives supposed to be secure in a post quantum world. The most popular cryptosystems based on errorcorrecting codes are the McEliece [22] and Niederreiter [24] ones. The main advantage of these two public key cryptosystems is the provision of a fast encryption and decryption procedure (about 50 times faster for encryption and 100 times faster for decryption than RSA).
Secure identification schemes were introduced by Feige, Fiat and Shamir [18] . These cryptographic schemes allow a prover to identify itself in polynomial time to a verifier without revealing any information of its secret key. Stern proposed at Crypto'93 [27] the first zero-knowledge identification scheme based on the syndrome decoding problem, this scheme could be turned into a digital signature via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [17] .
The concept of ring signatures was introduced first in 2001 by Rivest et al. [26] . Ring signatures permit any user from a set of intended signers to sign a message with no existing group manager and to convince the verifier that the author of the signature belongs to this set without revealing any information about its identity.
In 2002, Bresson et al. [12] extended ring signature schemes in a t-out-of-N threshold ring signature schemes, which enable any t participating users belonging to a set of N users to produce a signature in such a way that the verifier cannot determine the identity of the actual signers.
The concept of threshold ring signatures in code-based cryptography was introduced by Aguilar et al. in [1, 2] . Their proposal is a generalization of Stern's identification scheme. The major advantage of this construction is that its complexity depends linearly on a maximum number of signers N , comparing with the complexity of threshold ring signature schemes based on number theory whose complexity is O(tN ). However, the disadvantage of large public key size and signature length is still unsolved for this scheme.
Our Contribution: In this paper we propose an improved code-based threshold ring signature scheme. We achieve this by extending the five-pass zero-knowledge (q-SD) identification scheme proposed in [14] to a threshold ring identification scheme and applying the same idea as the Fiat-Shamir paradigm to transform it to a threshold ring signature. In this paper we provide also a first efficient implementation of the Aguilar et al. scheme and our scheme in order to show the advantage of our proposal in terms of performance.
Organization of the Paper: This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall some background on code-based cryptography. In Section 3 we present the q-SD identification scheme recently introduced by Cayrel et al. in [14] , followed by some suggested improvements. We show in Section 4 how to use the q-SD identification scheme to construct our proposal, then we discuss the security and gives in detail the performance aspect of our construction by providing implementation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall useful notions of code-based cryptography. We refer to [9] , for a general introduction to these issues.
Definitions
Linear codes are k-dimensional subspaces of an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q , where k and n are positive integers with k < n, and q a prime power. The error-correcting capability of such a code is the maximum number ω of errors that the code is able to decode. In short, linear codes with these parameters are denoted (n, k)-codes or (n, n − r)-codes, where r is the co-dimension of a code with r = n − k. 
Definition 1 (Hamming weight
and generates the dual space of C .
Let n and r be two integers such that n ≥ r, Binary(n, r) (resp. q-ary(n, r)) be the set of binary (resp. q-ary) matrices with n columns and r rows of rank r.
Moreover, denote by x $ ← − A the random choice of x among the elements of a set A.
We describe in the following the main hard problems on which the security of code-based schemes presented in this paper relies. This problem was proven to be NP-complete in 1978 [8] . It can be extended to arbitrary finite fields as follows.
Definition 3 (Binary Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem).

Input :
H $ ← − Binary(n, r), y $ ← − F
Definition 4 (q-ary Syndrome Decoding (qSD) problem).
Input : Notice that the difficulties of solving the two problems (qSD and qMD) are equivalent [28] . The intractable assumptions associated to these problems are denoted by qSD assumption and qMD assumption, respectively.
Best known attack. The most efficient algorithm to attack code-based schemes is the Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithm. Some improvements of this algorithm have been developed by Peters [25] , Niebuhr et al. [23] , and Bernstein et al. [10] , and recently in [21] by Becker et al. and [7] by May et al.. The recent results of this attack are taken into account when choosing our parameters.
The q-SD Identification Scheme
An identification scheme is an interactive method for one party to prove to another that a statement is true, without revealing any additional information. In this section, we present the recent q-SD identification scheme based on errorcorrecting codes proposed by Cayrel et al. in [14] . The soundness error of approximately 1/2 allows a performance gains when compared to Stern's scheme. For instance, one needs 16 rounds for the q-SD identification scheme and 28 rounds for the Stern's one to achieve the weak authentication probabilities of 2 −16 according the norm ISO/IEC-9798-5.
Description of the q-SD Identification Scheme
In what follows, the elements of F n q are written as n blocks of size log 2 (q) = m and each element of F q is presented as m bits.
We first introduce a special transformation that will be used later. 
The q-SD identification scheme is comprised of two algorithms: key generation and identification protocol. Given the security parameter κ, the key generation algorithm described in Fig. 1 picks a random (r × n) q-ary matrix H common to all users, a random vector s (secret key) with Hamming weight ω. It outputs the public key y by multiplication of the vector s by a matrix H. The identification protocol described in Fig. 2 corresponds to a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that the prover P possesses a private key s with a given public key y.
In Fig. 1 , WF ISD denotes the Work-Factor of ISD algorithm over F q and in Fig. 2 , h denotes a hash function, S n the symmetric group of degree n and || the concatenation of two strings.
The authors of [14] proved that the protocol presented in Fig. 2 corresponds to a zero-knowledge interactive proof in the random oracle model, that means it satisfies the completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties.
Key-Gen:
Choose n, r, ω, and q such that y, H, ω) ) Fig. 1 . Key generation algorithm: parameters n, r, ω, q are public Proposed parameters. According to the ISD algorithm, the suggested parameters for the q-SD scheme are: q = 256, n = 128, r = 64, ω = wt(s) = 49. Table 1 shows the advantage regarding the communication cost and the size of the public key of the q-SD scheme in comparison with Stern's initial proposal and his five-pass variant, for the same security level of 2 80 and an impersonation Remark 1. To be fair, the two improvements above-mentioned according the scheme q-SD are not taken into account in the calculation of the communication complexity in table 1, since these improvements can be applied to Stern's schemes. However by using the same seed for Σ and γ, the communication complexity will be 30864 bits, and only 26760 bits if we use in addition an encoding function.
Remark 2.
We want to mention that the authors in [3] propose a new fivepass identification scheme with small size of keys and an asymptotic cheating probability of 1/2, this scheme is related to the Véron identification scheme and its security is based on the syndrome decoding Problem. The idea of this construction is based on deriving new challenges from the secret key through cyclic shifts of the initial public key syndrome.
Signature Schemes from Identification Schemes
One efficient method to derive a signature from an identification scheme is given via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [17] . Pointcheval and Stern use the well-known forking lemma, in order to provide the security argument of signatures obtained from three-pass identification protocols. The authors in [4] extend the Fiat-Shamir transform and the Forking lemma to obtain secure signatures from identification protocols with multi-pass. For instance, in the case of a five-pass identification scheme, the signer replaces the two moves given from the verifier by the outputs of some random oracles, he sets the transcript (σ 1 ||h 1 ||σ 2 ||h 2 ||σ 3 ) as a signature of a message M , where h 1 and h 2 the outputs of two hash functions H 1 respectively H 2 modeled as random oracles, and the σ 1 , σ 2 and σ 3 the values given from the prover as in the identification scheme. Similarly to [20] , the authors of [4] generalize the forking lemma even more for ring signatures schemes in order to give security arguments for such a class of signature.
Code-Based Threshold Ring Signature Schemes
The notion of threshold ring signature is introduced in 2002 by Bresson et al. [12] . We first define the formal definition of the threshold ring identification scheme which can be turned to get a threshold ring signature in accord with Section 3.2. For the security of a threshold ring signature scheme the basic criteria are:
Definition 7. Let t < N be integers. We assume that each user
-Unforgeablity: Without the knowledge of the t secret keys, it is infeasible to generate a valid (t, N ) threshold ring signature. -Anonymity: Given a message-signature pair, it should be infeasible for the verifier to reveal which t-subset of signers generated a signature.
See defintion 3 and 4 in [2] for a formal definition of the two above properties.
In [1] , Aguilar et al. introduced the first code-based threshold ring signature. The main idea of this scheme is to generalize the Stern's identification scheme and then convert this latter into a threshold ring signature using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Aguilar et al.'s scheme is proven to be a zero-knowledge protocol with soundness error of 2/3 as in the Stern's protocol for each round. Its security relies on the hardness of the binary Minimum Distance problem. A second code-based threshold ring signature scheme has been proposed by Dallot and Vergnaud in [16] . Their proposal is not derived from an identification scheme. It uses Goppa codes and combines the generic construction of Bresson et al. [12] and the CFS signature scheme [15] . The authors of [16] obtained a short signature but the required time to generate it, is too high, and the huge public key size is also a disadvantage of their proposal.
Using the Aguilar et al.'s approach, Cayrel et al. proposed in [13] a latticebased threshold ring signature scheme based on the hardness of the SIS problem.
The soundness error of approximately 1/2 for the q-SD identification scheme allows a performance gains when compared to Stern's scheme. In order to make use of this gain, we present in this section a novel threshold ring identification scheme and according to Section 3.2, we turn it into a threshold ring signature scheme.
To describe our scheme, we need the two notions of block permutations: 
The constant (n, N )-block permutation Θ is a permutation over {1, . . . , N} which acts over vectors of length nN such that . . . , σ N ) be a family of N permutations over {1, . . . , n}, we define a (n, N )-block permutation Π, as a permutation which acts over a vector of length nN and which is the product of a constant n-block permutation Θ and the family σ, i.e. 
Description of Our Threshold Identification Protocol
We consider one set of N members. Let (P 1 , . . . , P t ) be a subset of this set consisting of the members who want to prove that they know some secret s, whereas one of them is a leader L. The parameter t corresponding to the number of provers has to be fixed at the beginning of the protocol.
Our protocol consists of the following steps: Setup, Ring public key generation, Commitment-Challenge-Answer and Verification step. We can formally describe each step as follows:
-Setup Given κ as security parameter, we generate the corresponding public parameters n, r, ω, and q such that WF ISD (n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2 κ , where n and r are the parameters for each matrix H i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) which will be used to form the ring public matrix. Each matrix can be constructed as follows: we choose a random vector s i ∈ F n q of weight ω, generate n − r − 1 random vectors and consider the code C i obtained by these n − r words (the operation can be repeated until the co-dimension of C i is r). The matrix H i is then a parity-check matrix of a code C i and thus we have H i s T i = 0, where s i ∈ F n q has a weight ω. The fact that we take a same syndrome and the same weight for the vectors s i helps for conserving the anonymity in the group. -Ring key generation The leader collects all these matrices and forms among them a public key (H, tω) called ring public key, the matrix H can be described as follows:
-Commitment-challenge-answer and verification step To simplify the description, we consider that the t provers correspond to the first matrices H i (1 ≤ i ≤ t) . The leader L, member of the set of t provers among N members, want to prove to the verifier that he knows a secret key s, where s is a nN vector of weight tw. This will be achieved by performing the following steps: -Each member of the t provers (including L) creates local commitments using the secret keys s i and sends them to L. -L collects all these commitments, simulates the missing ones for the (N −t) other users by fixing all remaining s i by 0, and create the master commitment using a random constant block permutation. -The master commitment are sent to the verifier V .
-V chooses a random value α over F q and sends it to L, the latter one forwards this value to the (t − 1) provers. -Each member of the t provers (including L) calculates the vectors β i , L collects those values and creates a global vector β using a constant block permutation and it will be sent to V . -V chooses a challenge from {0, 1} and sends it to L who forwards it to the (t − 1) provers. -L collects the answers from the (t − 1) provers, computes the responses for the other users and finally computes a global answer for V . -After receiving the global answer, V checks the correctness of the master commitments.
Algorithm 1 gives a full description of this interaction between the set of t provers and the verifier. This algorithm has to be performed in multi-rounds in order to reach the required impersonation resistance. We stress that during the answer step (line 19 of Algorithm 1), the knowledge of the permutation ρ permits to recover Θ, Σ i , and γ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In addition, the verifier can easily obtain β i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) by applying the inverse of θ on the known vector β .
Security
We first prove that the generalized q-SD identification protocol is an honestverifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The resulting threshold ring signature obtained from the application of the work presented in [4] on the generalized q-SD identification protocol is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.
Lemma 1. Finding a vector s of length nN such that the global weight of s is tw, the weight of s for each of the N blocks of length n is 0 or ω, and such that s has a null syndrome for H, is hard under the assumption of hardness of the qMD problem.
Algorithm 1. Generalized q-SD protocol
Input: n, k, N, t ∈ N, where k < n and t < N.
H ∈ F rN ×nN q , where r = n − k and h a collision resistant hash function.
, wt(sj ) = 0 or wt(sj ) = ω with wt(s) = tω and Hs T = 0.
Commitment step: (Θ(c2,1, . . . , c2,N ) ). 
2: Pi constructs c1,i ← h Σi||γi||Hiu
10: Pi computes βi ←−
Challenge step:
Answer step:
The first part of this step is between each prover Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ t) and the leader L.
14: if b = 0 then 15:
Pi sends γi and Σi to L.
16: else if b = 1 then 17:
18: end if
is an implementation detail not necessary for the algorithm. 
25: end if
Verification step:
26: if b = 0 then 27:
28: else if b = 1 then 29:
= tω, and that ρ(s) is formed of N blocks of length n and of weight ω or weight 0.
30: end if
Proof. The construction of the matrix H (described above) and the vector s implies that finding such a n-block of length nN is also equivalent to finding a solution of a local hard problem s i of weight ω such that H i s i = 0, which is hard under our assumption. Proof. We prove that our scheme satisfies the three properties: completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge.
Completeness: It is clear that each group of honest provers who has the knowledge of a valid secret key is able to answer correctly any of the honest leader's queries, which permit him to compute the master commitments. The leader, on his turn is able to reveal the information necessary to the honest verifier, in order to check the correctness of these commitments.
Soundness: In [14] it was proven that the regular q-SD scheme satisfies this property and that the soundness error is bounded by 1/2, assuming that the qMD problem is hard. Because our protocol can be seen as a composition of t simultaneous executions of the q-SD scheme and given that the latter one can be reduced to our protocol by making all signing instances equal, this implies that this soundness error cannot be higher than 1/2 for our protocol in one single round.
Zero-knowledge: The zero-knowledge property for our protocol can be proven in the random oracle model. In order to do that, we use the classical idea of resettable simulation. Let M be a polynomial-time probabilistic turing machine (simulator) using a dishonest verifier. Because of the two interactions with the leader (prover for our case), we have to assume that the dishonest verifier could contrive two strategies: St 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) taking as input the leader's (master) commitments and generating a value α ∈ F q , St 2 (C 1 , C 2 , β ) taking as input the leader's commitments, the answer β and generating as output a challenge in the set {0, 1}. M will generate a communication tape representing the interaction between leader and verifier. The goal is to produce a communication tape whose distribution is indistinguishable from a real tape by an honest interaction. The simulator M is constructed as follows:
Step 1. M randomly picks a query b from {0, 1}. (Θ||c 1,1 || . . . ||c 1,N ) and C 2 as a random string. By simulating the verifier, M applies St 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) to get α ∈ F q , and then computes β as follows: β = Θ (Π γ1,Σ1 (u 1 + αs 1 ), . . . , Π γN ,ΣN (u N + αs N ) ), and has the information needed to derive the simulated communication data between leader and verifier. Therefore the candidates to be written in the communication tape consist of elements A = C 1 ||C 2 , β and ans= ρ = Θ (Π γ1,Σ1 , . . . , Π γN ,ΣN ) . Taking into account the uniform distribution of the random variables used in the computation of A, ans and β , it follows that the distribution of these elements is indistinguishable from those resulting from a fair interaction. with weight tω and formed of N blocks of length n and of weight ω or 0. The commitments C 1 will be given uniformly at random values and C 2 = h (Θ(c 2,1 , . . . , c 2,N ) C 2 ) , M gets α ∈ F q and computes β as follows: β = Θ (Π γ1,Σ1 (u 1 + αs 1 ), . . . , Π γN ,ΣN (u N +  αs N ) ), and has the information needed to derive the simulated communication data. The communication set features elements A = C 1 ||C 2 , β and
The uniformly random character of the choices made will render these elements indistinguishable from those resulting from a fair interaction.
Step 2. M applies the verifier's strategy obtaining b as result.
Step 3 Therefore, in 2δ rounds on average, M produces a communication tape indistinguishable from one that corresponds to a fair interaction process execution that takes δ rounds.
We derive the following corollary due to the results from [4] .
Corollary 1. The resulting threshold ring signature scheme obtained from the honest verifier zero-knowledge q-SD identification protocol is unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2. Our threshold ring signature scheme obtained from the q-SD identification protocol is anonymous in the random oracle model.
Proof. The second property we would like to examine is the anonymity property in the random oracle model of the resulting threshold ring signature scheme obtained from our q-SD identification protocol. In other words, the verifier must not be able to determine the identity of the real signers, a part from the fact that they were at least t among the n specified ring members. For the challenge 0 the response of both real signers and the non-signers are completely indistinguishable, since Θ, Σ i , and γ i are chosen uniformly at random and therefore the response is random. So the only possibility to identify non-signers is challenge 1. In this case the verifier receives a permuted value of the secret key without having access to the used permutation. As consequence, the anonymity of the signers is preserved. 
Performance and Implementation
Theoretical Results. In general the signature length of signature schemes derived from identification schemes is constrained by the number of rounds. Our proposal is built by applying the q-SD identification scheme, which needs a smaller number of rounds to reach the same probability of cheating as Stern's identification scheme. For a probability of cheating of 2 −80 , one needs about 140 rounds for Stern's identification scheme and only 80 rounds for our proposal. This fact has a positive effect in terms of signature length for our proposal as we will see below.
Dallot and Vergnaud's scheme uses a CFS signature scheme as basis, therefore it inherits the advantage to provide a shorter signature length, however it suffers from slow signature generation cost and large key sizes compared to our construction.
In Table 2 we give our results in terms of key sizes, signature length and the signing cost for the parameter set (N, t) = (100, 50) in comparison with the code-based threshold ring signature schemes due to Aguilar et al. [1] and Dallot and Vergnaud [16] .
Before we do that we have to mention that the signature length of our scheme is N times the signature length of one q-SD signature length, similarly is for the computation of the public key size and the complexity of the protocol.
For our scheme, taking into account the performances of the ISD algorithm, we suggest the following parameters: q = 256, n = 128, r = 64, and ω = 49.
For the same security level, we need to take respectively: q = 2, n = 694, r = 347, ω = 69 for Aguilar et al.'s scheme [1] and, q = 2, n = 2 22 , r = 198, ω = 9 for Dallot and Vergnaud's scheme [16] .
We considered that all seeds used are 128 bits long, the hash outputs are 160 bits long, the security level is 2 80 , and that the probability of cheating is bounded by 2 −80 . Table 2 shows that for the same level of security, the public key size for our scheme is almost four times smaller than Aguilar et. al's one and 25344 times smaller than Dallot and Vergnaud's one. The signature length of our construction is 2384 Kbytes, where that of Aguilar et al.'s scheme is 2448 Kbytes and almost 7 Kbytes for Dallot and Vergnaud's one. For signing cost, we obtain better results.
Using the two improvement presented in Section 3, the signature length of our threshold ring signature scheme is almost 1633 KBytes.
We also compare our scheme to the recent work [13] , which is a lattice based threshold ring signature based on the hardness of SIS problem and is related to this work.
For a 111 bit-security, the authors of [13] obtain 45 Mbytes for the signature length. Using our scheme the signature length is only 4 Mbytes for the same security level and the same hash length (224 bits), using parameters q = 256, n = 204, r = 102, and ω = 71.
Remark 3.
To reduce more the public key size, we can use the proposal in [19] and [6] by replacing a random matrix H by a double circulant matrix respectively a quasi-dyadic matrix. In this case, we obtain a public key size in 12. 
Practical Results
General Remarks. The following tables show the timings we have obtained for a C implementation. The test system was an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E8400@3.00GHz, running Debian 6.0.3. The sources have been compiled using gcc 4.6.2.
In all cases, we used parity check matrices in systematic form. Due to the row-major order of C, the transposed matrices have been stored. The number of the ring members was always set to 100, the number of ring provers to 50. The tables show the setup time and the time running the protocol, where the setup time is consumed for the generation of the necessary public and private keys.
Finally, the use of quasi-dyadic matrices does not allow for all theoretically possible parameters. For instance, dyadic matrices have the dimension 2 p × 2 p (p ∈ N), which means that for quasi-dyadic matrices r = d2 p for some d ∈ N. In order to have comparable results and a uniform implementation, we have used this restriction for the random and the quasi-cyclic case as well.
Aguilar et. al Scheme.
The number of rounds for the scheme has been set to 28 (probability of cheating 2 −16 ), the dimension of the parity check matrix H T over F 2 has been set to 704 × 352, but only the redundancy part has been stored in memory, which is of dimension 352 × 352. The weight of the secrets been set to 76 (Table 3) .
Our Scheme. For our scheme the parity check matrices H T have been chosen over F 2 8 , mainly because in this case a field element fits exactly in one byte. The number of rounds has been set to 16 (probability of cheating 2 −16 ), the weight of the secrets has been set to 54. The number of the ring members was again set to 100 and the number of ring provers to 50 (Table 4) .
Remark 4.
As one can see, the computational cost for quasi-dyadic/-cyclic cases is always higher than using random parity check matrices. The reason is that the vector-matrix product is more expensive in those cases, because the matrix has to be reconstructed on the fly during the multiplication without actually building the whole matrix in memory. The savings in memory have to be paid for with additional runtime.
Remark 5. The given implementation is given as a proof of concept. For instance, the communication between the leader and the provers takes place on the same machine, even inside the same executable. In reality, the provers would be located on different computers, having a different architecture, connected to the leader via network connections and the like. In such a heterogeneous scenario, the communication latency for those network connections had to be taken into account. It also might be possible that some provers use a very fast machine, whereas others use a very slow one. The interaction process would be dominated then by the slowest possible prover.
Transforming into a Signature Scheme. Similar to the general technique shown by Fiat-Shamir, we can transform our scheme into a signature scheme. The idea is that the signing and verifying part are handled separately, i.e. at first, the leader simulates the challenge step of the verifier using a public stream cipher or public hash function with some predefined starting value involving the document to sign. The protocol is then run without further verification, but all the data which are needed for verification, in particular the master commitments, has to be recorded. These data form the signature.
The verifier uses the recorded data to run the protocol without the signing side. For the challenge step, the verifier uses the same starting value for the stream cipher or hash function as the signing part did. The document is part of this starting value. A consequence of this approach is that the signatures become quite large as everything needed for verification has to be recorded in the signature.
In Table 5 we give some timings for the resulting signature scheme. We used the same settings as above, but run the protocol with random matrices only. The savings using other matrix types is negligible compared to the gained signature sizes. The signature sizes are not fixed, but show a small variation depending on the values chosen during the challenge step. More specifically, the answers transmitted for the cases b=0,1,2 vary in size, which effectively leads to varying signature sizes as well. The values are therefore average values obtained while running the protocol 80 rounds (probability of cheating 2 −80 ).
Conclusion
Starting from the recently proposed q-SD zero-knowledge identification scheme [14] , we presented in this work a novel threshold ring signature scheme based on error-correcting codes based on the q-SD identification scheme. Since the q-SD scheme has a low soundness error allowing a specified security to be reached in few rounds, our construction uses this fact to achieve a scheme which shorter signature length, smaller public key size and signature cost compared to Aguilar et al.'s which is based on Stern's identification scheme. We have confirmed our results by implementing the both schemes in C that shows clearly the advantage of our proposal. The source code of our implementation can be found here: http://www.cayrel.net/IMG/tgz/waifi-files.tgz.
